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Abstract
We develop a two-country labour-market model characterised by union wage-
bargaining, in which the unemployed incur individual-specific costs of seeking work
abroad. We explore the effects on equilibrium unemployment in each country of
changes in union bargaining strength, the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages,
and employers’ willingness to hire foreign workers.  Unfavourable labour-market
institutions increase unemployment abroad as well as at home. We find that no
country has an incentive to internationalise its own labour market unilaterally,
because all the employment gains spill over abroad, which gives countries a strong
incentive to co-ordinate on internationalisation.
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1. Introduction
Labour-market institutions vary quite markedly across the OECD, and it has often
been claimed that these differences are at least partly responsible for differences in
economic performance (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bleaney, 1996; Bruno and
Sachs, 1985; Nickell, 1997; Siebert, 1997). The majority of OECD countries are
members of the European Union, which forbids employment discrimination against
nationals of other member states.   International labour flows are therefore potentially
large and, although cultural and linguistic barriers currently restrict such flows, these
barriers are likely to diminish in future. Yet very little attention has been paid to the
possibility that international labour mobility could have a significant impact on the
labour-market outcomes of particular institutional arrangements.  Moreover, even if
international labour flows appear small, they may be of a similar order of magnitude
to interregional labour flows, which are also small in most European countries.
2   For
example, international immigration has been a significant component of the
population growth of London and the South-east of England in recent years.
There is no body of theoretical work that (to our knowledge) addresses these issues.
The impact of monetary union on wage-setting and employment has been considered
in a number of papers (e.g. Calmfors, 2001; Cukierman and Lippi, 2001), whilst
Sibert and Sutherland (2000) analyse its effect on policy-makers’ incentives to
undertake labour-market reform.   In these models the critical issue is the choice of
currencies.  In order to focus on issues of international labour mobility independently
of countries’ choice of currency, we develop a two-country adaptation of a standard
flow-equilibrium model of the labour market.
The model assumes that there is an exogenously given turnover rate of jobs in each
country, and that job separations result in a spell of unemployment.  The equilibrium
rate of unemployment is given by the condition that job separations equal new hires.
We then introduce the possibility of hiring from abroad.  This sets up an interaction
between home and foreign labour markets, so that any factor which alters the home
equilibrium will, in general, affect the foreign equilibrium as well.  We provide a full
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in most European countries, compared with about 3% in the United States.3
characterisation of the comparative statics of the model.  Labour-market reform in one
country is, in general, good for all countries.  A particularly interesting result is that
what might be termed the “opening up” or “globalisation” of the home labour market
(i.e. a greater willingness to hire foreign job applicants) reduces foreign
unemployment without raising unemployment at home.  Countries therefore have
little incentive to adjust immigration rules unilaterally, but co-ordinated liberalisation
benefits all countries by offsetting some of the adverse employment effects of
generous unemployment benefit systems and union bargaining strength.
2. The model
We consider a two-country model, the two economies being defined as domestic and
foreign.  The domestic economy has a stock of U  unemployed individuals and the
foreign economy with the equivalent unemployed stock,  * U . [Henceforth, the
foreign counterpart is denoted by an asterisk.]   There are assumed to be individual-
specific costs of searching for employment in another country, which only some of
the unemployed choose to pay.  Of the U  home-based individuals, the proportion,
λ − 1 , look only at home for jobs, while the proportion, λ , look both at home and
abroad for work. We may refer to these as type-1 and type-2 individuals, because they
choose to seek work respectively in one and two countries.  There are also type-1 and
type-2 individuals abroad, in the respective proportions,  * 1 λ − , * λ , of the foreign
stock of unemployment. Although for simplicity we initially treat λ  and  * λ  as
exogenous, at a later stage of the analysis we shall allow them to be determined
endogenously (i.e. with each individual choosing his/her type in order to maximise
expected utility). 
The quit or turnover rate of employment (δ ) is assumed exogenous and identical in
each country.   The respective labour populations, employment levels and numbers of
quitters for each country are M  and  * M ,  U M −  and  * * U M −  and  ) ( U M − δ  and
*) * ( U M − δ .
In an equilibrium where quits equal new hires:
* * ) ( U U U M F D λ θ θ δ+ = − , ( 1 )4
U U U M F D λ θ θ δ * * * *) * ( + = −            (1*)
Consider equation (1).  At any moment,  ) ( U M − δ of the workers employed in the
domestic labour market quit due to exogenous factors.   Simultaneously, the domestic
labour market gets U  job applications from home-based unemployed individuals of
both types and  * *U λ  job applications from type-2 unemployed individuals who are
based abroad.   The proportion,  D θ , of the home-based applicants are accepted to
become re-employed at home, while the proportion,  F θ , of the foreign-based
applicants are accepted, which involves relocation to another country.  The possibility
that  F D θ θ≠  reflects discrimination, and generally we might expect a preference for
home-based workers,  F D θ θ> .
3  The same reasoning applies symmetrically to
equation (1*).    
The steady-state requires that net international labour flows are zero, so that the exits
of individuals equal entries
4 
5:
* * * U U F F λ θ λ θ=  (2)
We use the following definitions: 
θ θ≡ D , ηθ θ≡ F  where  1 0 ≤ ≤η (3)
* * θ θ≡ D  * * * θ η θ≡ F where 1 * 0 ≤ ≤η            (3*)
so that we can refer to η and  * η  as the discrimination factors in each country, which
we regard as exogenous.  Increasing discrimination against individuals based abroad
is captured by a declining η.  Although the value of η is chosen by firms decentrally,
government policies may also play a role (e.g. by altering the legal status of
employees with foreign nationality).  
Solving equations (1) and (2) simultaneously and using the definitions in (3) gives
solutions for the unemployment rate in each country as:
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5 We abstract from demographic factors, such as the number of school-leavers and entries and exits out
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Note that discrimination in one country raises unemployment
6 only in the other
country, as  0 *< ∂ ∂η u ,  0 * < ∂ ∂η u  and  0 = ∂ ∂η u ,  0 * * = ∂ ∂η u
We will consider a union model of the labour market in order to determine
independently the endogenous unemployment rates, u and * u , and the endogenous
acceptance rates, θ and * θ .   Such a model is a convenient method of capturing
differences in labour-market institutions across countries, which seem to be
empirically significant for employment outcomes.
The intertemporal utilities of varies states
The expected utility of the employed of type  2 , 1 = i  in firm  z  who expects to be type
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where  t Z W ,  is the wage currently paid by firm z ,  δ − 1  is the probability of remaining
employed in firm  z  in the next period and δ  is the probability of a spell of
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where  t B  is an unemployment benefit and, to recap, θ  is the probability of being
rehired by some firm at home in the next period and  * *θ η  is the probability of being
hired abroad.  Although searching in both countries increases the probability of a
home-based individual finding employment, this must be weighed against the extra
cost of searching abroad, C .
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Finally, equation (4) and the symmetry assumption imply that the expected utility of
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The above six equations constitute the intertemporal utilities of those based in the
domestic economy; there are also six equivalent equations for those based in the
foreign economy.   
This leads to the complication that whereas the utility of a domestic-based individual
who will always remain a type-1 can be determined by the simultaneous solution of
only four of these equations [(5), (6.1), (7) and (8.1)], the utility of a type-2 individual
would require the simultaneous solution of a possible maximum of twelve equations,
because of anticipated transitions between home and abroad.  This is compounded by
the fact that marginal individuals, outside a steady-state, may expect to change type
according to the incentives offered at any future time. 
For reasons of tractability, we assume that unions are concerned only the welfare of
those type-1 members with high extra search costs for whom:
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and that job separations are a random draw, so that a type-1 individual is as likely to
become unemployed as a type-2 individual. 
The wage bargain7
We consider the right-to-manage model, as applied in Nickell and Andrews (1983),
where the firm unilaterally determines employment by exerting its right to manage
after the wage has been determined by bargaining (such a model is attractive because
it seems a good approximation to reality and is relatively simple in structure).  There
is a prior, bilateral bargain over the wage in each firm, where both parties anticipate
this unilateral, Nash response by firms.  There is exactly one union per firm. 
Each union is utilitarian, and each union is concerned with the utility of both its
employed and unemployed members (respectively 
1
,t EZ V  and 
1
,t UZ V ). The expected
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membership and  t Z t Z M L , , < .  In the event of a disagreement, all members become
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Equations (4) and (5.1) give this as
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The firm has a Cobb-Douglas technology of labour alone, and has to pay  f , a fixed
cost, whether there is production or not.  If there is production, then profit is
f l W l A t Z t Z t Z t Z t Z − − = , , , , ,
α π            (11)
If there is no production, profit is  f − .  The right-to-manage assumption implies that
employment is set according to the profit-maximising condition:  
t Z t Z t Z W l A ,
1
, , =
− α α               (12)
Equations (10) and (11) give profits as:
α α α α α α α
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which is also the firm's bargaining surplus, as we are assuming there is neither output
nor wage payments in the event of a disagreement.  The outcome of the Nash wage
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with respect to the wage where 0 ≤ϖ ≤ 1 is the union's bargaining power.   The wage
solution is
() 1 , + − = t t t Z H B W φ ,w h e r e ( ) 1 1 1
1 ≥ − + ≡
− α ϖ φ   as   1 ≤ α                        (14)
The model is solved both in the steady-state where,
Z t Z V V = , , V Vt = t ∀            (15)
and in symmetric equilibrium where, 
V VZ = ,  W WZ = z ∀            (16)
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It is convenient to assume long-run proportionality between unemployment benefits
and wages:
bW B = ,            (21)
where the replacement ratio, b , represents the strength of commitment to income
equality.  As wages are homogeneous of degree one in benefits and vice versa, the
wage becomes a common factor on both sides of equation (20), to give a solution for
the endogenous acceptance rate for the domestic country,
) (
1
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and, likewise, for the foreign economy,9
) (
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The probability of the unemployed in getting a job is negatively related to union
power, the replacement rate, the turnover rate and positively related to the interest rate
as 1 > φ .  Note that the constraint that  1 < θ  places a lower bound on φ  of
() ( ) b r r ) 1 ( 1 + + + +δ δ  and likewise for  * φ .
Partial solution with exogenous proportions of type 2 agents, λ and  * λ .
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Note that the influence of other-country parameters in these equations depends on the
factor  λη∗ for the home country (λ∗η for the foreign country) – these factors
represent the own-country proportion of type-2 individuals multiplied by the other
country’s willingness to hire from abroad. We now consider the comparative statics of
unemployment where the  proportion of type-2 agents can be regarded as either
exogenous or, at least, highly inelastic.  We report only the comparative statics for the
domestic country; those for the foreign country are then apparent by symmetry of the
model.  
Propostion 1. Increased discrimination (a lower value of η) in one country raises
unemployment only in the other country.
Proof
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The magnitude of response is small, either if the proportion of type-2 individuals is
small or if unemployment is already small.  Note that the magnitude of all the
comparative statics is small if the unemployment rate is already low. ||
Proposition 2. A high number of type-2 individuals is good only for the unemployment
rate of the country in which they are based.
Proof
This again follows from differentiation of (23) and (23*):
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This effect is small, if there is high discrimination abroad. ||
Proposition 3. Generosity in domestic benefits and greater domestic union power
raise both domestic and foreign unemployment.
Proof
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Note that the impact of these variables on own-country unemployment is unaffected
by foreign variables or by the domestic willingness to hire from abroad.  Under
certain conditions it is possible that changes in the foreign replacement ratio will
affect domestic unemployment more than changes in the domestic replacement ratio.
This occurs if 
1 1 * 1 ) 1 ( *
− − − > −φ φ λη . For this condition to be satisfied, the foreign
economy must have substantially weaker unions than the domestic economy, and the
domestic unemployed must have good prospects of being hired abroad (because of a
low foreign discrimination rate and a high proportion of domestic type-2 individuals).
The same conditions tend to make increased union militancy abroad worse for
unemployment than the same at home, which occurs if
) 1 ( ) 1 * ( *) 1 ( ) 1 ( *
2 1 2 1 b b − − > − −
− − φ φ λη ; this is also more likely if the foreign
economy has less generous unemployment benefits. ||
   
Complete  solution with endogenous proportions of type 2 agents, λ and  * λ .
The results above are obtained by fixing the proportion of type-2 agents.   We now
relax this assumption and allow the proportion to be optimally determined. The
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where 
1
,t UZ V  and 
2
,t UZ V are as given in (6.1) and (6.2). From those equations, it follows
that a domestic unemployed individual, i, will be type-2 if the expected wealth
increase from finding a job abroad exceeds the extra cost of searching for a job
abroad:
() ) ( * * * i C V V U E > − θ η
where ) (i C  is the cost of searching abroad.  We assume that this extra search cost for
each domestic individual is also proportional to the domestic wage:
W i c i C ) ( ) ( =            (24)
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Using (21*), (23), (25*) and (26), the condition becomes
() () ) ( ) 1 ( 1
*
) * 1 ( 1 ) (
* 1
*) 1 )( 1 ( * 1 1 1



















− + − − −
− δ φ φ δ φ δ
φ
η
The wage ratio,  W W * , is not determined by anything in the model so far.  It is
possible to determine this by imposing an equality condition between domestic and
foreign profits in (17).
7 
If the technology parameters are the same, because of full technology transference in
the steady-state, and the Cobb-Douglas exponent is also the same, then the wages are
equalized, so the condition becomes
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For a given distribution across individuals of proportional search costs,  ) (i c , the
proportion of type-2 agents is determined by the proportion for which this inequality
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allow individual entrepreneurs to move across national frontiers until profit differences are arbitraged
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so,
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Proposition 4. One country's proportion of type-2 individuals is independent of its
own replacement ratio but decreasing in the other country's replacement ratio.
Proof
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Note that the effect in (27.2) is particularly strong when the other country’s unions are
weak (φ* is small).  ||
Proposition 5. Strong domestic unions and weak foreign unions raise the domestic
proportion of type-2 individuals.
Proof
This proposition also follows immediately from differentiating (27):
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Likewise, for the foreign economy, 
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Note that two-way mobility requires that the two degrees of union power are not too
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In its absence, there would be one-way mobility, which is problematic in the steady-
state.   This suggests that union power in one country cannot get too much out of line
with the degree of union power in the other country, implying that union reform in
one country would also cause pressures for the same reform in the other.  
Proposition 6. The endogeneity of λ  amplifies the adverse effect of the foreign
replacement ratio,  * b , and union power ,  * φ , on domestic unemployment.
Proof
Take a constant elasticity approximation of (27), since these approximations are
generally valid locally ( 0 > ε ):
()
ε η λ λ d * 0 =            (28)
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The proposition follows directly from a comparison of equations (23) and (29). The
amplification is very powerful where the interest rate is low.  Moreover, the effect of
domestic union power is at least dampened, and, possibly, even reversed for some
parameter values, notably, in the limit of generosity where  1 → b .||15
3.  Conclusions
In the presence of international labour mobility, one country’s unemployment rate
depends on other countries’ labour-market institutions as well as its own.
Consequently, labour-market reform benefits foreign countries as well as the home
country.   In the model developed here, however, this effect does not dilute the home
country’s incentive to reform its labour market, since international labour mobility has
no effect on the domestic employment gains from reform. 
On the other hand, the employment gains from globalisation (in the sense of opening
up domestic labour markets to foreign-based workers) are entirely external –
globalisation reduces foreign unemployment but not domestic unemployment.  This
suggests that countries will have no incentive to "go it alone" by legislating to prevent
discrimination against foreign workers, unless there are other economic, political or
ideological reasons for doing so.   However, there are clear gains from co-operation
where each country provides an environment of equal or better opportunities for
employing the other country's unemployed, since then unemployment is reduced in all
countries.
8 
The relationship between this result and political or other pressures for labour-market
and welfare reform remains largely a matter of speculation.   Internationalisation
might alleviate the pressure for these other reforms in social-democratic countries,
while it may be viewed as another arm with which to fight unemployment in more
conservative societies. 
The results also imply that, as labour markets become increasingly internationalised,
domestic unemployment becomes more sensitive to the state of foreign labour
markets. Consequently, international co-operation in opening up domestic labour
markets to foreign-based workers will create a further incentive for international co-
operation in determining labour-market policies.  Conversely, the desire for an
                                                          
8 To achieve this, it is not necessary to form an economic union, but only to pass simultaneous
legislation restricting discrimination. 16
ultimate autonomy in domestic labour-market policy may put a brake on any initial
movement towards internationalisation. 
References
Blanchard, O.J. and J. Wolfers. 2000. The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of
European unemployment: the aggregate evidence, Economic Journal 110, C1-
C33.
Bleaney, M.F. 1996. Central bank independence, wage-bargaining structure, and
macroeconomic performance in OECD countries, Oxford Economic Papers
478, 20-38.
Bruno, M. and J.D. Sachs. 1985. Economics of Worldwide Stagflation, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Calmfors, L. 2001. Unemployment, labour market reform and monetary union,
Journal of Labor Economics 19, 265-89.
Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi. 2001. Labour markets and monetary union: a strategic
analysis, Economic Journal 111, 541-65.
Nickell, S. 1997. Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North
America, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (3), 55-74.
Nickell, S. and Andrews, M. 1983. Unions, real wages and employment in Britain,
Oxford Economics Papers (Supplement), 183-206.
Sibert, A. and A. Sutherland. 2000. Monetary union and labor market reform, Journal
of International Economics 51, 421-35.
Siebert, H. 1997. Labor market rigidities: at the root of unemployment in Europe,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (3), 37-54.